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1. Introduction
Proponents of agent-based modeling (ABM) and agent-based computational economics (ACE)
believe that these approaches employ new and different methods of investigation compared to
those employed in standard economics, and also believe that employing these new methods
makes it possible to reconstruct economics on a sounder basis (e.g., Gallegati and Kirman, 2012;
Tesfatsion, 2006). Whether economics might rest on a ‘sounder basis’ is a methodological
question regarding the nature of the grounds on which our explanations rest. Though ‘method’
and ‘methodology’ are often used interchangeably, method concerns the techniques, tools, and
means of scientific investigation, whereas methodology concerns the philosophy of science of
economics and the basis on which scientific explanations are validated and judged in regard to
whether they produce knowledge. If we suppose, then, that the introduction of new methods in
economics improves economic explanations, does this mean that their introduction not only
improves the content of economics but also improves our understanding of economic
methodology in regard to what counts as a good explanation in economics? That is, does the
introduction of new methods in economics not only produce new economics but also new
economic methodology?
Many, perhaps most, might answer this question in a negative way, denying that the basis on
which explanations are evaluated in economics changes, and holding that economic methodology
provides a given set of unchanging standards by which we evaluate all theories and approaches
in economics whatever methods they employ. Our methods and tools may develop and allow
improvements in economics, but the methodological grounds for evaluating economic theories
do not change. This view, however, is inconsistent with the fact that historically economic
methodology has undergone and continues to undergo evolution and change (Hands, 2001). We
do not reason about the grounds for believing our theories in the same way today as we did in the
past. The unchanging standards view is also contrary to what some proponents of ABM and
ACE claim, namely, that their methods involve a new type of economic methodology (e.g.,
Epstein, 1999, 2006). This paper defends this latter view, and argues that economics, its
methods, and economic methodology all evolve together. More specifically, it argues in the
present connection that the adoption of new methods of investigation associated with ABM and
ACE also advances economic methodology and our understanding of the nature of explanation in
economics, thus justifying the view that these methods make it possible to reconstruct economics
on a sounder basis. The grounds for this position, I will argue, are captured by the idea that
improvements in how we know something, a matter of method, improve whether we know
something, a matter of methodology.
The paper distinguishes the two views about the nature of economic methodology above as
follows. I characterize the idea that economic methodology provides a given set of unchanging
standards as closed approach to economic methodology, and associate it with standard
economics’ strict reliance on traditional inductive and deductive methodological arguments and
with idea that methodology should be seen solely as epistemic evaluation.
In contrast, I
characterize the idea that economic methodology evolves as open approach to economic
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methodology, and associate it with the role that reflexivity, counterfactual reasoning, and
abduction play in ABM and ACE and with the idea that methodology should also understood as
practical activity.
To provide a further basis for this opposition, I link it to two ways of understanding economics’
subject matter and consequent nature as a science. I pair the view that economic methodology
provides a given, unchanging standard of evaluation with a natural science model of economics
– the idea that economics’ object of investigation is unchanging just as the laws of nature are
unchanging in the natural sciences. Then I pair the view that economic methodology evolves
with a social science model of economics – the idea that economics’ social world object of
investigation makes it a science that evolves together with the evolution of the world it
investigates. Figure 1 summarizes my view of how standard economics and ABM/ACE
economics differ in methodological terms.

Figure 1
Methodological differences between standard economics and ABM/ACE economics

Standard economics
ABM/ACE economics

Economic methodology
Unchanging
Evolves

Methodology approach
Closed
Open

Science model
Natural
Social

Section 2 begins with an examination of simulation as a new set of methods and tools employed
in ABM and ACE, and asks: how do these new methods and tools produce a new conception of
economic methodology? This question is addressed by reviewing Joshua Epstein’s influential
argument that agent-based computational models and simulation analysis employ a distinctive
‘generative’ approach to economics and social science which is fundamentally different from
both traditional inductive and deductive approaches to economics and social science. To explain
this, I emphasize the link between how we know something and whether we know something, and
argue that what is distinctive about ABM and ACE economic methodology is its character as a
practice, specifically a reflexive practice based on counterfactual reasoning.
Section 3 discusses how recent philosophers of science understand the methodological claims in
ABM/ACE and in Epstein’s argument, and focuses on the innovation that simulation analysis
involves in creating a role for a how-possibly type of explanation. Here I interpret this in terms
of roles played by abduction and retroductive explanation, and argue that together with the
reflexivity concept, this type of explanation provides the conceptual foundations needed for
treating ABM/ACE as an open, practice-based approach to economic methodology.
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In Section 4 I go on to argue that understanding ABM/ACE in this way can be shown to imply
that it operates with a social science model of economics, which contrasts with conventional
economic methodology’s commitment to a natural science model of economics.
I first
distinguish these two types of science models in terms of their different views of economics’
subject matter and its relation to the nature of economic investigation, and then argue that
ABM/ACE’s use of simulation analysis implies that it operates with a social science model of
economics. To further illustrate this argument, I then map the range of activities the ABM/ACE
approach involves and presupposes in Figure 2.
Section 5 turns to a controversial issue that continually arises in debates regarding the
ABM/ACE approach, namely, interpretation of concept of emergence. My view is that this
concept is best analyzed following a stage-setting discussion of the more basic methodological
matters treated in the previous sections. This section first discusses Epstein’s thinking regarding
the concept’s interpretation, and then links its interpretation to the idea of modeling economics
as a social science rather than a natural science. Section 6 concludes the paper with remarks
about the nature and role of economic methodology in economics.

2. Simulation, generative social science, and reflexivity
Simulation methods are now widely employed in science.1 They are used in standard economics
in computable general equilibrium models (CGE), but are constrained to computing equilibrium
paths of macroeconomic variables.
Agent-based models differ in allowing macroeconomic
regularities to form in a bottom-up way as a result of agent interactions. This makes agent-based
simulations ‘generative’ in the specific sense that, absent this top-down coordinating mechanism,
the macrostructures and regularities that result are strictly the product of the agent interaction
process.
Yet ‘generative’ has meanings additional to this one.
One concerns the idea of
emergence, which I discuss in Section 5.
The meaning I discuss here concerns whether a
generative social science involves an innovation in economic methodology.
Epstein explicitly argues it does in making the case that the ABM and ACE research program
constitutes a scientific advance on standard economics (Epstein, 1999, 2006).2
Agent-based
models move from given a microspecification simulation of agents and their behavior, that is, the
explanans, to the macrostructures and regularities that result from their interaction, that is, the
explanandum. Epstein first points out, then, that it has been shown that computational models
are sufficient for generating macrostructures of interest. Second, he asserts that, once a candidate
microspecification has been shown to produce a macrostructure of interest through repeated
1

For a recent review of the philosophical literature on simulation with particular attention to the social sciences, see
Grüne-Yanoff and Weirich (2010).
2
His argument follows from his Sugarscape book with Robert Axtell (Epstein and Axtell, 1996), which in turn
reflects the checkerboard models of racial segregation of Thomas Schelling (Schelling, 1971, 1978) who was a
pioneer of agent-based computational modeling (albeit without the benefits of the digital computer). Epstein (1999)
is republished as the first chapter of Epstein (2006)
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application of a given set of agent-interaction rules, the demonstration that this macrostructure
has been ‘grown’ from that microspecification then counts as a necessary condition for the
explanation of that macrostructure. He summarizes this by saying: “If you didn’t grow it, you
didn’t explain its emergence” (1999, p. 43), or logically, (∀x) (¬Gx ⊃ ¬Ex).
Why should having ‘grown’ or generated a macrostructure from a given microspecification count
as a necessary condition for its explanation? Consider conventional inductive explanations that
employ statistical rules to move from data to general propositions. Those rules are applied to
data and are independent of that data. We trust induction to reach general conclusions about
many things, but our faith in it is independent of the relationship between any given set of data
and the general propositions it supports. In contrast, macrostructures that simulations produce
are derived from the agent-interaction rules that generate them, so that our general conclusions
necessarily depend on – are ‘grown’ from – the basis from which they are derived. Consider also
conventional deductive explanations. In this case, we explain particular phenomena as instances
of general propositions. We also have confidence in many of our deductive explanations, but left
unexplained is how we arrive at the general propositions from which we make deductions. In
contrast, in simulations we can see how we arrive at general relationships, which are ‘grown’
from their explanation in micro-relationships.
Thus, compared to both conventional inductive and deductive explanations, what generative
explanations provide is an account of how particularity and generality are linked. Accordingly, it
seems fair to say that the claim that ABM and ACE research program provides a distinctive
innovation in economic methodology rests on the idea that how we know something, the
particulars of the matter, is fundamental to whether we know something, our general conclusions
about it, and that this connectedness is absent from standard inductive and deductive economic
methodology. Epstein also discusses how generative explanations include elements of inductive
and deductive explanations (Epstein, 1999, pp. 43-4), but this does not alter the main point here,
and I will instead emphasize something else central to simulation and this emphasis on how we
know something, namely, its practical character as a process or activity.
Both inductive and deductive explanations involve a logic of explanation based on universal
rules regarding relationships between particular phenomena and general propositions. Those
universal rules prescribe how such explanations are made in a well-defined way to produce
determinate results. In contrast, generative explanations based on simulation describe an openended set of activities whereby microspecifications and macrostructures are continually adjusted
to one another, often in a largely experimental manner, until a macrostructure ‘of interest’ is
produced. Moreover, since such macrostructures are often unexpected, further simulations using
alternative microspecifications tied to what else might be ‘of interest’ typically follow, so that
rather than the closed, well-defined approach inductive and deductive explanations involve,
generative explanations are better characterized as an on-going activity or an investigative
practice.
In this respect, I claim generative explanations indeed do indeed constitute an
innovation in economic methodology: they substitute the idea of explanation as a process and
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practice for the conventional idea that explanation is an epistemic logic subsumed under specific
universal rules.
In Figure 2 in Section 4, I map the multiple different investigative dimensions and research
activities that simulation and the ABM/ACE approach involve to show that generative
explanations involve a whole set of practices distributed across different interacting scientific
communities. This conclusion is important to contrasting the social science model of economics
of ABM/ACE with the natural science model of economics of standard economics, the subject of
Section 4. Here, however, my goal is to elicit the first of two main methodological concepts I
argue lies behind the idea of generative explanation as a practice, namely, the concept of
reflexivity – in the next section I discuss the second concept, abduction.
The concept of reflexivity in the current connection concerns feedback effects on some process
that influences its performance.3 In causal terms, feedback effects modify the underlying causal
process, and potentially produce evolving pathways for social and economic processes.4 Why
reflexivity is important to the ABM/ACE approach lies in its process or activity conception of
scientific explanation as a continual adjustment of microspecifications and macrostructures to
one another in an effort to produce macrostructures ‘of interest.’ What simulation involves for
researchers is a continual evaluation of how the determination of a particular set of
microspecifications reflexively ‘feeds forward’ to produce specific macrostructures, and how the
goal of producing different macrostructures ‘of interest’ reflexively feeds backward on a redetermination of microspecifications. Epstein points out that simulation activities continue until
the repeated application of a given set of agent-interaction rules produces macrostructures ‘of
interest.’ Thus, the investigative activity involved is intrinsically a reflexive one of assessing and
re-assessing feedback effects from microspecifications to macrostructures and from the latter to
the former until researchers are satisfied with some outcome.
It is important to note, then, what is distinctive about reasoning in reflexivity terms in this type of
scientific explanation process. Simulation methods construct artificial worlds that resemble and
imitate real worlds, and consequently they compare what could be the case in terms of how that
artificial world is microspecified with what could be the case in resulting macrostructural terms
were the real world to closely resemble the artificial one. That is, reasoning in reflexivity terms
involves counterfactual reasoning, where this involves specifying conditions that could hold but
are contrary to the facts regarding what is believed to hold, sometimes referred to as ‘other
possible worlds’ reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning, then, should be contrasted with
‘unconditional’ reasoning that assumes existing facts as its basis, employs standard logic, and
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The reflexivity concept also operates in logic, for example, in connection with paradoxes of self-reference, e.g., the
Cretan liar paradox, Bertrand Russell’s set of all sets not members of themselves (Irvine and Deutsch, 2016), Oskar
Morgenstern’s (1928) prediction paradox, etc.
4
I formally set out how feedback effects can modify main causal processes and can account for cumulative
causation in Davis (2016).
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assumes away ‘other possible worlds.’5 In language terms, counterfactual reasoning is expressed
in the subjunctive mode while unconditional reasoning is expressed in the indicative mode.
Note, then, that standard economic methodology, which relies on conventional inductive and
deductive forms of explanation, is typically expressed in the indicative mode and employs
unconditional reasoning. Above I characterized such explanations as closed in virtue of their
reliance of well-defined procedures of evaluation. Added to this now is that they are also closed
in their avoidance of counterfactual reasoning.
In contrast, generative explanations, which
employ a practice conception of economic methodology, are developed around possibilities, and
depend on a series of conjectured cases intended to identify macrostructures that might be
produced. I characterized such explanations above as open in virtue of this practice-process
conception.
Added to this now is that they fundamentally depend on reflexivity and
counterfactual reasoning. In fact, this conception has been suggested by recent philosophers of
science in connection with the idea of how-possibly explanations. In the next section I turn to
this view and the role I argue is played by the second main methodological concept associated
with ABM and ACE approaches: abduction.

3. How-possibly explanations and abduction
Why have so many economists resisted adopting ABM and ACE simulation methods? One
reason is that they have been trained in econometric methods and know little about programming
methods. Another reason is that this would displace equilibrium as a central concept in
economic explanations, and many economists find it difficult to imagine economics without that
concept. An economic methodology reason is that simulation methods fall short of what many
economists believe good explanations in economics ought to involve, as argued by Aki Lehtinen
and Jaakko Kuorikoski (2007). On their view, ABM/ACE simulation methods are inconsistent
with “the prevailing image of understanding among economists” that emphasizes “analytical
rather than numerical exactness and adeptness to logical argumentation rather than empirical
knowledge of causal mechanisms” (p. 306). Standard models in economics simplify complex
economic relationships by representing them in terms of a small set of idealized relationships
that are analytically tractable using standard mathematical methods. Analytical tractability, or
formal exactness, in the explanations that this produces (also facilitated by the equilibrium
assumption) is then valued over numerical exactness, associated with representations of the
world that are less idealized and more detailed, thus more descriptive of actual economic
relationships.
For Lehtinen and Kuorikoski what accordingly defines simulation in economics is “imitating an
economically relevant real or possible system by creating societies of artificial agents and
institutional structures” (p. 307). Imitation, then, replaces idealization, and this shifts the weight
5

In logic, counterfactual reasoning is associated with hypothethical or counterfactual conditionals as compared to
material conditionals (cf. Arlo-Costa and Egré, 2016) and also with possible worlds reasoning and modal logic (cf.,
Menzel, 2016).
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of explanation from formal exactness to numerical exactness. At the same time, the freedom
created by giving up the equilibrium assumption constraint opens-up a simulated system’s
dynamics to a wide range of descriptive possibilities. Then, the activity of sorting through the
multitude of new possibilities for a system’s performance also gives simulation a quasiexperimental character that contrasts with emphasis on precise calculation of a specific set of
outcomes in conventional modeling. Thus, Lehtinen and Kuorikoski’s answer to why most
economists have been reluctant to adopt ABM and ACE simulation methods is that those
methods are inconsistent what they call the “economists’ perfect model” (p. 306), one based on
idealization and precise argument.6
Consider in this connection, then, how simulation in economics employs abduction as a third
form of explanation distinct from both induction and deduction. Abduction, also retroduction,
especially as associated with the thinking of Charles Sanders Peirce and pragmatism (cf. Burch,
2014), moves from an observation to the theory thought most likely to account for that
observation, that is, it infers a best possible explanation of that observation. Abduction appears
to resemble both induction and deduction, but neither is it the case that the theory arrived at is a
generalization from evidence, nor is it the case that that the observation can be deduced from the
theory inferred (because other theories might also explain the observation). By comparison with
induction and deduction, then, abduction is not a closed, rule-driven form of inference with welldefined procedures but rather an open, conjectural form of inference characterized by incomplete
and contestable explanations. In this respect, it clearly falls well outside standard economics
methodological vision emphasizing formal exactness that Lehtinen and Kuorikoski emphasize.
At the same time, the incompleteness and contestability of abductive explanations characterizes
ABM/ACE modeling quite well, especially in relation to the nature of simulation as an openended, on-going type of investigation better seen primarily as a practical activity than as an
exercise in an epistemic logic.
In particular, ABM/ACE modeling is abductive when seen as a generative social science that
aims to account for how macrostructures of interest might be grown from microspecifications.
Epstein’s principle is: if you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain it. It might also be stated: if you
didn’t find a specific set of microspecifications from which that macrostructure of interest can be
grown, then you are not in a position to show how you have explained that macrostructure. That
is, if the idea behind generative explanations is how we know something tells us whether we
know something, one’s problem is not so much showing that a macrostructure can be grown from
a given set of microspecifications as much as determining what possible microspecifications for
that macrostructure – the how – might even be found to exist in the first place. I characterize this
focus on discovery as the special virtue of abductive explanations. The emphasis, that is, rests
less on demonstrating inferential connections (to the best possible theory) and more on
discovering the possible grounds for inference for whatever matter is at hand.

6

Also, they argue, the idealization view lines up with what many economists believe to be a fundamental objective
of all science, explanatory unification, as discussed by Philip Kitcher (1993).
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This, it seems fair to say, leads us to think about ABM/ACE modeling and abductive generative
explanations as involving how-possibly type of explanations (Marchionni and Ylikoski, 2013;
Ylikoski, 2014). A how-possibly explanation answers a conjectural what-if question, and so
emphasizes the exploration of a subject matter rather than demonstrating that certain
relationships must characterize that subject matter. Indeed, how-possibly explanations do not
rule out other possible explanations – the problem of equifinality – but rather focus on what
might be learned were a certain conjecture entertained.
Of course, the idea that we might be interested in how-possibly something might be the case
could well strike some as substituting guesswork in science for rigorous investigation. However,
this response assumes that we already largely know the main mechanisms that explain behavior
in economics.
It also ignores that how-possibly explanations of candidate behavioral
mechanisms are still subject to the same testing and examination via robustness analysis that any
theoretical inquiry involves (Kuorkoski, Lehtinen, and Marchionni, 2010; Marchionni and
Ylikoski, 2013).
Perhaps, then, the reason that some are inclined to dismiss how-possibly
explanations is that they suppose economics has been quite successful in identifying the
mechanisms that account for behavior, and thus see no need for any kind of exploratory
investigation of such mechanisms. Yet the impact of bounded rationality theory on standard
choice theory in economics tells us that there is still considerable space for theoretical
conjectures and how-possibly explanations regarding behavioral mechanisms in economics. So
clearly there exists a role for abduction in economics, as ABM and ACE modelers have shown.
Let me summarize the argument in this and the previous section. A generative economics/social
science is different from traditional approaches in economics in that the simulation method it
employs emphasizes the link between how we know something and whether we know something.
This makes ABM/ACE pre-eminently a practical activity rather than simply a matter of
epistemic evaluation (though the latter is certainly included in the former), and provides the basis
for characterizing it as an open type of economic methodology rather than a closed one. I then
argued that when we examine how simulation research is carried out, we see that the reflexive
nature of the research process involved emphasizes counterfactual reasoning while the howpossibly character of the explanations it produces emphasizes abduction.
Neither of these
important methodological concepts plays a significant role in standard economic methodology.
Thus, they provide the grounds for the claim that the ABM/ACE approach constitutes an
innovation in economic methodology. Just as that approach involves new methods and new
theories, so those new methods and theories are accompanied by new approach to economic
methodology. In the following section, then, I discuss why ABM/ACE employs a social science
model of economics, lay out in Figure 2 a mapping of ABM/ACE practice, and contrast this with
what a natural science model of economics involves.

4. ABM/ACE and the social science versus natural science models of economics
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Broadly speaking, I distinguish the natural sciences and the social sciences as follows. In the
natural sciences, the development of science can influence what things actually happen in the
world, but does not alter the principles or laws that explain how world works. In contrast, in the
social sciences, I argue that not only does the development of science influence what things
actually happen in the world, but it can also alter the principles or laws that science develops to
explain how world works. Why this difference?
In the natural sciences the object of investigation, nature, is inert in the sense that it lacks a
capacity for understanding science, and thus cannot change in response to the development of
science. In the social sciences the object of investigation, at least where agents are involved, is
active in that it possesses a capacity for understanding science, and therefore can change in
response to the development of science. This capacity for understanding science, then, creates
the possibility that agents fundamentally change their behavior as a result of the development of
science, so that the principles or laws that social science develops need to change to explain
changes in behavior. In economics, I call this view the social science model of economics. Of
course, it is also possible that having a capacity for understanding science does not
fundamentally change agents’ behavior, and that the principles or laws that science develops do
not change with the development of science. In economics, I call this view the natural science
model of economics, because it treats its objects of investigation as de facto natural objects.
Proponents of the natural science model of economics, the dominant position in economics, often
point to such things as the law of demand or the principle of comparative advantage as evidence
that the principles or laws in economics do not change, but relative to natural science have
comparatively little to justify a natural science model of economics. Proponents of the social
science model of economics sometimes point to the idea of cumulative causation, but this
conception is controversial and not well defended. In any event, a methodological argument can
be made that the ABM/ACE approach employs a social science model of economics. I set out
this argument in terms of interaction between the effects science is assumed to have on the world
and the effects the world is assumed to have on science – a two-way causal relationship that
implies that the content of economics and the world evolve together.
In regard to the effects science has on the world, first note the role that imitation plays in
simulations.
As emphasized by Lehtinen and Kuorikoski, simulations aim at “imitating an
economically relevant real or possible system by creating societies of artificial agents and
institutional structures” (p. 307).
Second, note that ABM/ACE simulations often reveal
unexpected links between agents’ behavior and macro patterns of behavior, as for example in
how Schelling with his checkerboard models of racial segregation showed that the behavior of
agents with relatively mild preferences regarding neighbors can produce highly segregated
neighborhoods. Should agents, then, believe that simulations often imitate the world, and should
they regard the unexpected outcomes those simulations produce as undesirable, ABM/ACE
researchers assume that agents will change their behavior, thus showing that science can have
effects on the world.
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Yet this opens the door to the reverse causality where the world affects science, since should
agents change their behavior, this means that simulations of this behavior need to be revised to
capture this changed behavior. Moreover, should new simulations of this changed behavior
produce further unexpected results that again influence agent’s behavior, then agents’ behavior
needs to be re-modeled again, and so on and so on, such that there is a continual two-way
interaction between science and the world. The open character of ABM/ACE methodology
discussed above, then, ultimately reflects the approach’s social science model of economics. I
emphasized that the idea that ABM/ACE methodology is open-ended is tied to the connection
between how we know something and whether we know something. We can see, then, that this
connection is continually being re-determined in virtue of economics’ changing relation to a
changing subject matter.
To further illustrate this, let us extend this two-way interaction between science and the world to
the relationship between ABM/ACE research and economists. Economists, of course, are also
real world agents, so if ABM/ACE research affects the behavior of real world agents and vice
versa, then the same interaction should apply to ABM/ACE research and economic researchers.
That is, here also there is a two-way interaction between that research and the behavior where
each influences the other.
In this case, however, there is an additional dimension to consider. In the Schelling example, for
convenience I said that ‘agents’ may change their behavior in response to what Schelling’s
analysis reveals, but did not disaggregate different types of agents and different types of
behavioral responses. Here I add in that complication by emphasizing the multiple kinds of
investigative activities that impinge on ABM/ACE research, thus disaggregating types of
researchers as agents and thus types of behavioral responses, in order to exhibit a more complex
set of interaction effects between researcher behavior and ABM/ACE research. Figure 2 exhibits
these multiple investigative activities, and associates them with different, relatively independent
research groups in the following way.
In the (1) – (2) relation, those engaged in object-oriented programming (OOP) and those engaged
in ontological analysis each influence the another. OOP in economics agent-based modeling
employs computational entities meant to reflect agent relationships in economics, and the nature
of agency is a central concern in ontological analysis. In the case of the (2) – (3) link, OOP
underlies the computational models developed by another set of researchers in micro
specification terms, and the development of these models in turn influences OOP researchers.
The (3) – (4) relation involves ABM/ACE researchers running simulations that produce macro
regularities that are possibly of interest. However, whether a particular macro regularity is of
interest depends on what many other groups of researchers know about empirical macro
regularities, so (5) influences evaluations of (4), while unexpected results in the case of (4) can
also stimulate empirical research in the case of (5). This (4) – (5) interaction, then, leads to respecification of micro models, (6), which builds on previous model specifications, (3). All this
occurs, moreover, in the context of theories of micro-macro relationships that many different
researchers debate, or (7), and finally, micro-macro theories are influenced by researchers
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engaged in methodological analysis, here specifically epistemological analysis, regarding the
nature of explanation in economics. (I have italicized (3), (4), and (6) to identify them as
ABM/ACE activities in contrast to the others.)

Figure 2
The multiple investigative activities associated with ABM/ACE explanations

(2) Object-oriented programming

↔

(1) Ontological analysis

→

(4) Macro regularities

↕
(3) Micro model specification

↕

←

(6) Micro model re-specification

↕
(5) Macro evidence

↑
(7) Micro-macro theories

↑
(8) Methodological analysis

Again, I frame the social science model account of ABM/ACE in terms of the two-way
interaction between the effects ABM/ACE has on the world, now in the form of the activities of
the different research groups distinguished in Figure 2, and the effects the world, that is the
activities of these different research groups, has on ABM/ACE. In regard, then, to the effects
ABM/ACE has on the research groups in Figure 2, to the extent that ABM/ACE produces
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unexpected applications and uses of the activities of these groups, it is fair to say this may impact
their research activities. Independent research groups typically have their own views of the use,
significance, and interpretation of their research. Should its application in ABM/ACE show their
research has new, unexpected uses, significance, and interpretation, then this may influence their
future development.
Consider, for example, the (4) – (5) interaction.
Unexpected macro
regularities resulting from ABM/ACE simulation analysis is likely to lead to new empirical
investigations of macro relationships to test their scope and significance.
However, the disaggregated nature of economic activity across groups in Figure 2 adds a further
dimension to how ABM/ACE influences the activities of research groups. Since many of these
groups also interact with each other, changes in any one of their research activities may also
influence other groups as well as subsequent modes of interaction between them. This then adds
a further set of influences of ABM/ACE on research activity.
Finally, the reverse causality, where how ABM/ACE research activity, specifically the italicized
(3), (4), and (6), is influenced by various other research activities that impinge upon it, should be
clear. For example, much of that research is framed by micro-macro theories that economists
have long debated, (7), and considerable accumulated evidence regarding macro regularities, (5).
So, the influences that ABM/ACE research has on these different activities has return effects on
itself – the two-way street relationship of the social science model of economics.
Of course, it could still be the case that the de facto natural science model of economics is
correct, and that there exist deep underlying principles and laws governing behavior in economic
life that the many different research activities and groups in economics all seek to identify.
However, the range of different types of research activities not only distinguished here but also
in economics as a whole casts doubt on this. Since different research activities generally identify
different kinds of enduring relationships, practically speaking there is limited consensus across
economics regarding what basic principles and laws govern behavior. Economists do speculate
about deep relationships, but different schools of thinking subscribe to different views about
what these relationships are. The multiplicity of such views across research activities and
between schools, then, makes the case that a single set of principles and laws governs economic
behavior to little more than speculation.

5. Emergence in the ABM/ACE
Epstein’s thinking about the meaning and usefulness of the concept of emergence reflects an
ambivalence many ABM/ACE researchers seem to share. In their Growing Artificial Societies
Epstein and Axtell defined “emergent phenomena” as “stable macroscopic patterns arising from
local interaction of agents,” and distanced themselves from the idea such phenomena need to be
‘unexpected’ or ‘surprising’ (1996, p. 35). Terms such as these were employed in the 1920s by
British emergentist thinkers such as Samuel Alexander, C.D. Broad, and C. Lloyd Morgan who
argued that emergent phenomena are ‘unexpected’ or ‘surprising’ when associated with
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properties of wholes (or macro properties in ABM/ACE terms) that are not deducible from their
constituent properties (or micro properties in ABM/ACE terms).7 Epstein, however, argues that
for every computation there exists a corresponding logical deduction. Generative explanations
consequently imply deductions, and agent-based modeling and emergentism understood in terms
of non-deducibility must be incompatible (Epstein, 1999, pp. 43-4).8 Thus, emergent phenomena
are characterized only as “stable macroscopic patterns arising from local interaction of agents.”
Epstein nonetheless allows that the ideas of ‘unexpected’ or ‘surprising’ still have meaning and
use, and a more modest emergentism is still consistent with ABM if we avoid a logical confusion
associated with the earlier use of the concept previously articulated by postwar philosophers of
science. Specifically, rather than think of emergentism in terms of properties of things in the
world, we ought to see the concept as applying to propositions expressed in formal languages
(Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948). Then, that ‘unexpected’ or ‘surprising’ propositions about the
properties of wholes that are not deducible from propositions about the properties of their
constituent elements can be seen such only relative to the current state of knowledge expressed
in such languages, and not seen as referring to ontological features of the world.
Emergence is not an ontological trait inherent in some phenomena; rather it is indicative
of the scope of our knowledge at a given time; thus it has no absolute, but a relative
character; and what is emergent with respect to the theories available today may lose its
emergent status tomorrow (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948, p. 263).
Or in the words of Ernst Nagel: “emergent” only “baptizes our ignorance” (Nagel, 1961, p. 371),
and the confusion that earlier British emergentist thinkers suffered was to think that the concept
should be understood in ontological rather than in epistemological terms. Accordingly,
‘unexpected’ or ‘surprising’ are simply subjective terms, as Epstein and Axtell originally
suspected, and ought to be employed only to register the state of current thinking about micromacro relationships.
This conclusion, then, assumes that the ontological and epistemological can be strongly
separated, rejects saying that the concept of emergence has ontological meaning, and restricts its
meaning and use to our orientation toward the state of knowledge at any point in time. Yet this
conclusion is inconsistent with seeing ABM/ACE as employing a social science model of
economics. On that view, economics and the world it investigates evolve together with each
influencing the other, so that what is the case ontologically is not independent of our knowledge
of the world.
One motivation, then, for restricting the concept of emergence to epistemology is the discomfort
many feel with the mystical connotations of its use in ontology. To say there exist genuinely
emergent phenomena paradoxically suggests that some phenomena lack a basis in existing
7

See C.D. Broad on this in particular (Broad, 1925, p. 61).
To be clear, Epstein points out that the converse does not apply: not all deductive explanations are generative,
since ‘if you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain it.’
8
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phenomena – an ex nihilo idea often associated with religion. Fair enough. However, what
earlier proponents of a strong concept of emergence actually argued was that emergent (macro)
phenomena are simply non-deducible from other (micro) phenomena. More specifically, they
argued that pure deductive inference was unable to explain certain phenomena, which is indeed
what Epstein argues in regard to generative explanations.
Epstein’s central point is that one needs to be able to show how something was generated in
order to explain it, and this certainly runs counter to a strong concept of emergence.
His
characterization of this, however, is formulated only in terms of producing adequate simulations,
and ignores both the ways in which science affects and world and the world affects science
together – the economics social science model idea – and also the location of simulation as an
activity within a set of connected activities in economics as shown in Figure 2. When we then
broaden his view in these ways, we see quite clearly that macro regularities that simulations
produce are likely not deducible from their micro specifications because so many matters
external to those simulations have gone into their construction and interpretation. Epstein is right
to say every computation can be represented as a deductive inference. This is because this
occurs after-the-fact of a successful simulation, and compacts all that went into that simulation’s
success into ‘final’ results. Yet he gives up the concept of emergence too easily by accepting the
idea that the non-deducibility criterion concerns inference between propositions.
The social science model of economics, then, does support a strong concept of emergence. I
distinguish, however, the way in which this follows from the Figure 2 disaggregated nature of
the whole set of research activities connected to simulation research, and the way in which it
follows from the basic idea that science and the world affect each other and evolve together. The
former Figure 2 grounds are ad hoc in that non-deducibility is only a feature of the organization
of science. It is possible (though unlikely) that a re-organization of science could overcome this.
The latter grounds, however, provide strong reasons for emergence as non-deducibility since if
science changes the world and the world changes science, one should expect this to be
problematic for deductive inference, which presupposes stability in the assumptions from which
we derive conclusions.
This, in fact, provides a further rationale for the idea that how we know something tells us
whether we know something.
In lieu of deduction and induction providing always-reliable
grounds for judging what counts as knowledge, the generative science, practice-based idea of
being able to show what works irrespective of its epistemological validation provides science an
additional pathway.
I turn, then, in the final section to brief comments regarding the idea
advanced at the beginning of this paper that economic methodology evolves together with the
evolution of economics and its methods.

6. Concluding comments regarding the nature of economic methodology
Economic methodology, or the philosophy of science of economics, investigates and examines
the basis on which explanations in economics are validated and judged regarding whether they
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produce knowledge. As a meta-discourse and an important means of arbitrating developments in
economics as a science, our bias is to assume, or hope, that this basis is independent of the
science it evaluates. However, economic methodology being independent of what it evaluates is
not a matter of its not being influenced by it. Rather, its being independent of what it evaluates
is a matter of the difference between methodology’s evaluative function and economics’ science
function (to produce knowledge about its object of investigation). Thus, economics influencing
methodology does not necessarily undermine the latter, and in fact we should rather expect
economic methodology to evolve as economics evolves. Or more broadly, that the methods, or
techniques, tools, and means, by which economics pursues its science function evolve, causing
economics to evolve, implies that how economic methodology pursues its function regarding
economics must also evolve.9
I believe this argument stands on its own, but the deeper basis for it in this paper is the social
science model of economics, which provides an understanding of the impetus for change in
economics. Note that different views of why change and development occurs in economics are
associated with the natural science and social science models of economics. In the natural
science model, the object of investigation is essentially unchanging and does not influence
economics’ development. Thus, the impetus for economics’ development is simply the quest for
greater knowledge of a given world – arguably a classic Enlightenment ideal that arose with the
eighteenth century development of natural science rather than with nineteenth century social
science. In the social science model of economics, the object of investigation changes with the
development of economics, and this in turn necessitates change in economics. In this case, an
important impetus for economics’ development is that past knowledge is always at risk of
obsolescence. Rather than explain the development of science and economics in terms of an
Enlightenment idealism of scientists’ high motives, scientists are motivated by the potential
failure of scientific theories and also potentially the need to explain new, even ‘emergent’
phenomena. At the same time, we know that in a continually changing world, new technologies
and means of investigation often result from the changing effects of the world on science. So,
the means or capacity for developing new theories also continually changes. This, it seems, is
particularly true of ABM/ACE, which has developed around new simulation techniques, rising
computing power and significantly larger volumes of data. It constitutes, then, an especially
strong example of a science program developing together with its methods and methodology.
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